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The ‘rest of medicine’ and psychiatry:
why paradigms would differ
In their paper, Bracken et al1 have cogently put forth the
limitations of psychiatry comparing its differences with the ‘rest
of medicine’. They turn our attention to some moral and ethical
notions viz relationships, meanings and values, which not only
have therapeutic scope but also humanistic importance. Applying
evidence-based logic, they show the inadequacy of technological
interventions (psychopharmacotherapeutics or therapy-specific
aspects of psychotherapies), and at the same time cite evidence
of effectiveness of ‘non-technical’ aspects of care. Considering
some of these aspects and the online response it generated, it is
important that we refocus our attention to a central and some
associated issues.
First, unlike what Bracken et al propose, medicine’s assumptions
on causal mechanisms are still a hotly debated issue. Medicine’s
apparent authority over human health was convincingly
questioned in a historical analysis by Thomas McKeown and his
arguments much advanced by Simon Szreter. In short, rather
than technical innovations in medicine (such as the advent of
antibiotics or immunisation), social and political interventions
had a decisive role in advancing human health.2
Second, as the field of epidemiology progressively advances
and uses newer analytic techniques, monocausal explanations
(as the germ theory of disease propounded) gave way to
multicausal (as in the case of chronic disease epidemiology) and
finally to complex eco-epidemiological causal explanations.3 In
fact, an active engagement with the notion of embodiment that
explains how biological processes are influenced profoundly by
environmental determinants (e.g. social, cultural, economic,
political) lies at the heart of social epidemiology.4 And biological
outcomes are not often mediated by our psyche, although the
latter may be similarly affected.
Third, an attempt to compare the effect sizes of pharm-
acological interventions in both general medical disorders and
psychiatric disorders show, barring a few exceptions, that effect
sizes of psychiatric drugs are in the same range (i.e. small to
medium) as most other pharmacotherapeutics.5
Moreover, the oft referred crisis in psychiatry also bothers the
‘rest of medicine’ and healthcare. Some features of this crisis are
the increasing difficulty of grappling with the explosive boom in
health-related technologies (consequently increasing the cost
of healthcare), the challenge produced by the epidemiological
shift in disease prevalence and the marked social inequalities in
health. In addition, the notions of ‘medicalisation of everyday
life’/overmedicalisation, healthism, biomedicalisation and the
dominance of the technological paradigm in medicine have also
drawn wide criticism. In not considering these as entirely good
or bad, the problem is the undue attention to individualised
solutions and personalised/customised technologies,6 transforming
health to individual moral responsibility.7
On the other hand, under the foregoing transformations in
healthcare, medical training instils qualities such as objectivity
and emotional distancing to maintain clinical neutrality, concepts
partly counterposed to values, narratives and meanings. Similarly,
clinicians have come to associate professional status and power
with increasing technological involvement in clinical practice,
rather than with being sensitive to the patient’s distress and
life story. Although clinical knowledge is based on biological
understanding and scientific methods, it is also interpretive and
narrative.8
Thus to paraphrase Bracken et al, it is not just mental health
problems but all health problems in general that undoubtedly have
a biological dimension, and that by their very nature can reach
beyond the body to involve social, cultural and psychological
dimensions.
1 Bracken P, Thomas P, Timimi S, Asen E, Behr G, Beuster C, et al. Psychiatry
beyond the current paradigm. Br J Psychiatry 2012; 201: 430–4.
2 Szreter S. Rethinking McKeown: the relationship between public health and
social change. Am J Public Health 2002; 92: 722–5.
3 Krieger N. Proximal, distal, and the politics of causation: what’s level got to
do with it? Am J Public Health 2008; 98: 221–30.
4 Krieger N, Smith GD. ‘Bodies count’ and body counts: social epidemiology
and embodying inequality. Epidemiol Rev 2004; 26: 92–103.
5 Leucht S, Hierl S, Kissling W, Dold M, Davis JM. Putting the efficacy of
psychiatric and general medicine medication into perspective: review of
meta-analyses. Br J Psychiatry 2012; 200: 97–106.
6 Crawford R. Healthism and the medicalization of everyday life. Int J Health
Serv 1980; 10: 365–88.
7 Clarke AE, Mamo L, Fishman JR, Shim JK, Fosket JR. Technoscientific
transformations of health, illness, and U.S. biomedicine. Am Sociol Rev 2003;
68: 161–94.
8 Montgomery K. How Doctors Think: Clinical Judgment and the Practice of
Medicine. Oxford University Press, 2006.
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Authors’ reply: We are broadly in agreement with the thrust
of Dr Das’s analysis. In our original article, we cited Arthur
Kleinman’s call for ‘medicine in general’ to go beyond a
technicalised understanding of ‘caregiving’ and we also noted
the resonance between our position and that of Iona Heath in
relation to general practice.
We agree entirely that ‘an active engagement with the notion
of embodiment’ would represent a very positive agenda for all
of medicine. Our experiences as human beings are shaped by
our physiology and the particular way it has evolved over
centuries. However, they are also shaped by the particular cultural
and historical context in which, and through which, we come to
know ourselves and the world around us. In the lived reality of
human beings, mind, body and social context are inseparable.
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But a medicine that sees itself as, primarily, a set of technical
interventions will always strive to compartmentalise and
conceptualise illness in simplified causal models. This represents
a challenge for all branches of medicine.
Are we wrong to distinguish psychiatry from the ‘rest of
medicine’? Maybe. Bill Fulford has argued convincingly that the
widely held view that bodily illness is ‘relatively transparent in
meaning’ and less ‘value-laden’ than mental illness does not stand
up to scrutiny.1 For him, it is simply that the values inherent in
our concepts of bodily disorder are just not as obvious as those
involved in our discourse of mental illness. When the presenting
problem is pain from an arthritic joint or from a myocardial
infarction, there is usually agreement between the doctor, the
patient and the carer about what the priorities are and what would
count as recovery. However, as medical technologies (such as in
reproductive healthcare) develop, more areas of disagreement
emerge and ethical issues become more obvious. In the world of
mental health, disagreements about values, priorities and
frameworks have always been part of day-to-day work and thus
value judgements more obvious.
However, although we accept this analysis, we are not entirely
satisfied that this is the full story. When we put the adjective
‘mental’ in front of the word ‘illness’, we do seem to be delineating
a particular territory of human suffering. This cannot be clearly
defined and seems to resist easy categorisation. But the word
‘mental’ implies that this is suffering that emerges from the
mind, and whatever the ‘mind’ is, it is not simply another organ
of the body. In this way, there does seem to be some sort of
epistemological difference between psychiatry and other branches
of medicine such as cardiology, endocrinology or neurology.
Problems with our thoughts, feelings, behaviours and
relationships would seem to be more intimately entwined with
questions of meaning and context than problems arising from
lesions in specific organs of the body.
Whatever we make of the relationship between bodily and
mental illness, psychiatry grapples daily with epistemological
and ontological issues and has a long history of doing so. A
psychiatry that is able to ‘move beyond the current paradigm’
might be one that can offer insights and leadership to other parts
of medicine.
1 Fulford KWM. Moral Theory and Medical Practice. Cambridge University
Press, 1989.
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Low Apgar scores in neonates with prenatal
antidepressant exposure
We read with interest the very important and thought-provoking
study by Jensen et al.1 The authors have found an increased rate of
low Apgar scores in neonates with prenatal antidepressant
exposure, especially with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs).1 However, the use of other antidepressants (new or old)
and a diagnosis of maternal depression were not associated with
low Apgar scores.1 The study has several merits: nationwide data,
large sample size, meticulous record keeping, sound methodology,
appropriate use of statistics, controlling confounders to a large
extent and, most importantly, having been conducted in a
clinically relevant area, where data were limited and there were
more questions than answers.
However, there are certain issues with the study. First, the
authors have not mentioned which of the SSRIs was implicated
in having the greatest or least effect on lowering Apgar score.
Second, the dose and duration of antidepressant use were not
mentioned and adherence to antidepressants was also not assessed.
Third, antidepressant data were collected from psychiatric centres
only, perhaps because the authors did not have access to data from
general practitioners, which further limits the generalisability of
the study findings. Fourth, the authors have not mentioned and
not controlled for important confounders such as the presence
of a physical disorder in the mother, obstetric complications
and nutritional status of mothers, which may also contribute to
a low Apgar score. Fifth, there is a possible mistake in tabulating
the gestational age of all pregnancies, as the interquartile range is
stated as 39–39 weeks (see Table 1). Finally, the authors have
themselves mentioned about the significant differences in the
antidepressant prescription trends. During the study period, use
of antidepressants was very limited in pregnant women, but
recently antidepressant use has increased substantially, especially
that of SSRIs. This may be an important reason for getting high
odds ratios for low Apgar scores with the use of an SSRI. Earlier
studies have also reported low Apgar scores with maternal SSRI
use.2,3 Exposure to SSRIs at an early age can disrupt the normal
maturation of the serotonin system and alter serotonin-dependent
neuronal processes in the fetus3 and these effects are partly
moderated by infant SLC6A4 genotype.4
Today, authors have advised caution and proper monitoring of
infants with prenatal antidepressant exposure. This study will
definitely provide impetus for future research in this area, and
with more robust data, it may also act as a starting point for
the modification of existing treatment guidelines.
1 Jensen HM, Grøn R, Lidegaard Ø, Pedersen LH, Andersen PK, Kessing LV.
Maternal depression, antidepressant use in pregnancy and Apgar scores in
infants. Br J Psychiatry 2013; 202: 347–51.
2 Lund N, Pedersen LH, Henriksen TB. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor
exposure in utero and pregnancy outcomes. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2009;
163: 949–54.
3 Oberlander TF, Bonaguro RJ, Misri S, Papsdorf M, Ross CJ, Simpson EM.
Infant serotonin transporter (SLC6A4) promoter genotype is associated with
adverse neonatal outcomes after prenatal exposure to serotonin reuptake
inhibitor medications. Mol Psychiatry 2008; 13: 65–73.
4 Maciag D, Simpson KL, Coppinger D, Lu Y, Wang Y, Lin RC, et al. Neonatal
antidepressant exposure has lasting effects on behavior and serotonin
circuitry. Neuropsychopharmacology 2006; 31: 47–57.
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Authors’ reply: We would like to emphasise that our study
included nationwide data on the use of all antidepressants in
Denmark wherever prescribed (including from primary care),
however nationwide data on the diagnosis of depression were only
available from in-patient and out-patient psychiatric hospital
settings (and not from primary care). Thus, as argued in our
paper, we believe our findings can be generalised to all women
taking antidepressants during pregnancy regardless of the
indication for treatment (depression, anxiety disorder, etc.) or
the severity of illness.
Although, the study included more than 34 000 women who
used an antidepressant before or during pregnancy, this number
was too small for separate analyses of the individual antidepressants
divided into the eight risk groups defined in the study. Register-
based medication studies at present do not have access to data
on the dose of drug treatment or on patient adherence to the drug.
We did try to adjust our analyses for physical disorder in the
mother as all analyses were adjusted for all other types of
medication (in addition to antidepressants) that the mother
may have used during pregnancy, in this way taking account of
treated physical and mental disorders as well as depressive and
anxiety disorders. We further adjusted analyses for maternal age,
employment status, smoking status, calendar year, parity, gender
of the newborn, +birth weight and +gestational age, however
we did not include data on nutrition of the mother and on
obstetric complications as suggested. Obstetric complications
may rather be intermediary factors than confounders.
Regarding the gestational age of all mothers, this was correctly
indicated in Table 1 as a median of 39 (interquartiles 39–39), as
infants with a gestational age less than 22 weeks were excluded
from analyses and the vast majority of children were born within
week 39.
Like Nebhinani & Soni, we hope the study will provide
impetus for future research in this increasingly important area,
especially as the use of antidepressants during pregnancy is
believed to increase even further in the future.
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Are the conclusions supported by the evidence?
Many people might be confused about the term ‘placebo’ that
is used in Baxendale et al’s study.1 The paper clearly refers to
the low-intensity-light arm as receiving placebo treatment, and
the clinical trial registration (http://clinicaltrials.gov/show/
NCT01028456) also indicates that the low-intensity group is
receiving a placebo. However, this has some implications for the
interpretation of the results.
If the low-intensity arm is indeed a placebo, the active
treatment group did not differentiate from placebo and this is,
therefore, a negative study. If, however, the low-intensity arm is
receiving an active treatment then there is no placebo group and
we cannot determine whether any changes in symptoms were
due to the treatment or would have occurred by chance.
The conclusions that light therapy may ‘be an effective
treatment for symptoms of low mood in epilepsy at lower
intensities than those typically used to treat seasonal affective
disorder’ cannot be supported by the findings of this study, since
there was not an adequate control group. Further, the authors
acknowledge that a number of non-specific factors may account
for any improvements in depression and anxiety and all participants
received relaxation. I strongly suspect that the fact that the
participants had their eyes open during relaxation does not negate
the effects on anxiety that relaxation training might have. In
addition, most of the improvement in both groups (particularly
on the depression subscale) had occurred before they were
exposed to the intervention, i.e. at T2.
The clinical trial registration indicates that the control arm
should have been receiving 100 lux for 30min a day and the active
arm 10 000 lux for 30min a day. The study suggests that both arms
received 20min of light per day, with the control arm receiving an
intensity of 2000 lux. It is not clear why the intensity was increased.
The attrition rate was high in both groups: 18/45 (40%) in the
control arm and 15/46 (32.6%) in the active arm. Five patients in
the active arm had an increase in seizures or required their
medication to be increased (compared with two patients in the
control arm). In the other paper emerging from this study,2 the
authors caution about using bright light in this population
because ‘it may result in an increase in seizures for some’. None
of this caution is evident in the paper published in the British
Journal of Psychiatry. Indeed, there is not a single mention of
adverse effects, despite them being reported elsewhere.
The analysis does not appear to have been intention-to-treat,
and the results are only reported for those patients that completed
the trial. This is a significant weakness when the authors have
reported the possibility of adverse effects in other journals and
when the attrition rates are relatively high. It is not clear why this
intervention in an epilepsy population is treated with some
reservations, yet it is reported much more favourably when there
are some improvements in a secondary outcome measure
reflecting some aspects of mental health (anxiety and depressive
symptoms) which occurred before the intervention.
1 Baxendale S, O’Sullivan J, Heaney D. Bright light therapy for symptoms
of anxiety and depression in focal epilepsy: randomised controlled trial.
Br J Psychiatry 2013; 202: 352–6.
2 Baxendale S, O’Sullivan J, Heaney D. Bright light therapy as an add on
treatment for medically intractable epilepsy. Epilepsy Behav 2012; 24:
359–64.
David Christmas, NHS Tayside, Dundee, UK. Email: david.christmas@nhs.net
doi: 10.1192/bjp.202.6.465a
Author’s reply: Dr Christmas is quite correct in reiterating the
uncertainty we expressed in our discussion about the placebo
condition in our study. This does indeed have very significant
implications for the interpretation of our results. It is for this
reason that we suggested a number of different interpretations
for our findings in the Discussion, including the possibility that
light therapy ‘may, therefore, be an effective treatment for
symptoms of low mood in epilepsy at lower intensities than those
typically used to treat seasonal affective disorder’. We also
discussed the possibility that this could indeed be a negative
finding or that the results we found could be due to other factors
unrelated to light therapy, such as the establishment of fixed
morning routines.
Dr Christmas is correct in that in the original protocol for
the study the control arm should have been receiving 100 lux.
The modifications to the original protocol were submitted with
the paper as an online appendix, to conform to the CONSORT
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guidelines for reporting trials. In this case, when the light boxes
were modified to 100 lux, the disparity in intensity was very
obvious and we did not feel that the study would conform to
the important double-blind aspect of the design. It would have
been very clear to any patient who received the 100 lux box that
they had been assigned to the low-intensity arm of the trial. We
therefore modified the boxes to administer 2000 lux at 20min
in the low-intensity arm. The boxes appeared bright, but literature
on seasonal affective disorder indicates that this would not be a
therapeutic dose within this time frame, whereas 10 000 lux at
20min would be a therapeutic intensity/dose.
As we stated in the introduction to our study, the primary
outcome measure for this trial was seizure control. We have
reported these results separately1 and that paper is fully referenced
in our study. Although it is possible that bright light therapy may
result in an increase in seizures for some patients, this was not a
statistically significant finding in our previous study and, as yet,
the risk remains theoretical. Clinicians will be aware that seizure
control should be carefully monitored following the introduction
of any new treatment offered to people with epilepsy.
In presenting the results of our study for publication we have
sought to provide as clear an account of the data as possible. The
results are by no means clear-cut or definitive. However, there are
some interesting aspects to the data that suggest that this may not
be a dead end in terms of a treatment option for some people with
epilepsy. This study stands as a guide for future research. We hope
that its limitations, which we fully acknowledge and have set out at
length in the Discussion, will serve as a useful guide for future
research in this area.
1 Baxendale S, O’Sullivan J, Heaney D. Bright light therapy as an add on
treatment for medically intractable epilepsy. Epilepsy Behav 2012; 24:
359–64.
Sallie Baxendale (on behalf of the authors), Department of Neuropsychology
(Box 37), National Hospital for Neurology & Neurosurgery, Queen Square, London
WC1N 3BG, UK. Email: s.baxendale@ucl.ac.uk
doi: 10.1192/bjp.202.6.465b
Results for behavioural activation are overstated
The study by Moradveisi et al,1 which is applicable to both
secondary mental health and primary care, looks at the prospect
of using minimally trained staff in delivering behavioural
activation against pharmacological intervention in the treatment
of severe depression. We would like to highlight the following
points for further clarification.
First, an obvious problem of the study was the lack of a
placebo arm, which would have lent credibility. As the cultural
avoidance of antidepressants in Iran has been highlighted, adding
a placebo group would have removed some bias such as paying for
medication in the treatment as usual (TAU) group after 3 months
and also in the analysis.
Second, sertraline was used at a suboptimal dose and was
slowly titrated, against prevailing practice. A meta-analysis shows
an optimum dose for sertraline between 100 and 150mg/day –
doses below the therapeutic range were significantly less effective,
i.e. by 7%.2 Sertraline reached its lowest therapeutic dose of
100mg at 6 weeks. All drop-outs occurred before the mid-point
assessment and only three were as a result of medication side-effects.
Third, there was a significant difference in the amount of
attention that participants received in each group. Participants
in the behavioural activation group received 50% more face-to-
face sessions than the TAU group. The study did not adjust for this
in the analysis.
Fourth, last observation carried forward (LOCF) was used in
the study. However, 5% of drop-outs occurred in the behavioural
activation group as opposed to a significant 30% from the TAU
group. Last observation carried forward is used frequently in
intention-to-treat studies but standard errors and confidence
intervals from LOCF underestimate uncertainty.3 As there are
no strategies for universal use, reasons for the choice of a certain
method have to be provided when designing and analysing clinical
trials.4 Last observation carried forward analysis seems to have
favoured the behavioural activation group.
Many other limitations of the study are cited in the paper
itself. Significant numbers of participants were recruited via
advertisement or word of mouth, which seemed to have attracted
more women and perhaps more psychologically minded individuals.
It would have been helpful to include these advertisements as a
supplement to the paper in order to identify any bias.
Finally, we wondered whether an ethics committee would
allow this type of study to go ahead in the UK as it included
individuals with severe depression. In England and Wales, before
recruitment to a trial, potential participants must be assessed
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005; in Scotland, the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (para. 72) must be used.5 Since the
authors of the study state that ‘the study’s aim was to investigate
whether a simple psychological treatment [. . .] would be a viable
alternative to antidepressant medication [. . .] in a non-Western
country’, we are unsure of an equivalent law in Iran and whether
this criterion was met.
1 Moradveisi L, Huibers MJH, Renner F, Arasteh M, Arntz A. Behavioural
activation v. antidepressant medication for treating depression in Iran:
randomised trial. Br J Psychiatry 2013; 202: 204–11.
2 Bollini P, Pampallona S, Tibaldi G, Kupelnick B, Munizza C. Effectiveness of
antidepressants. Meta-analysis of dose–effect relationships in randomised
clinical trials. Br J Psychiatry 1999; 174: 297–303.
3 Mallinckrodt C, Clark W, David S. Accounting for dropout bias using mixed-
effects models. J Biopharm Stat 2001; 11: 9–21.
4 Unnebrink K, Windeler J. Intention-to-treat: methods for dealing with missing
values in clinical trials of progressively deteriorating diseases. Stat Med 2001;
20: 3931–46.
5 General Medical Council. Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions
Together. GMC, 2008.
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NHS Foundation Trust, Middlesbrough, UK
doi: 10.1192/bjp.202.6.466
Authors’ reply: We thank Kripalani & Suleman for their critical
remarks. Before addressing them point by point, a general
remark is required. Our trial was an effectiveness, not an efficacy,
trial. We compared a new treatment previously tested elsewhere
(behavioural activation) with treatment as usual (TAU) (anti-
depressant medication) in Iran. An effectiveness trial aims to
assess outcomes in usual care, not to test specific mechanisms,
which affects the type of control condition(s). Some criticisms
make sense from an efficacy study point of view, not from an
effectiveness study point of view. Also of note is that the initial
response to TAU was quite good, and that the longer-term
response of behavioural activation accounted for its superiority.
We do not see how a placebo arm could have assessed cultural
influences on TAU. To study this interesting topic, both a placebo
and a natural course condition are needed to see whether placebo




Second, several sources state that 100mg sertraline is a
sufficient dose.1,2 Moreover, the dose is a valid representation of
usual practice in Iran, as there is reluctance to increase the dose
given findings that ‘often, adequate clinical activity, and saturation
of the 5-HT transporters, are achieved at starting dosages. As a
rule, higher dosages do not increase antidepressant efficacy, but
may increase the risk of adverse effects’.2
Third, the difference in the amount of attention given is
an inherent aspect of comparing behavioural activation and
TAU in routine practice. Adjusting for this difference would
lead to an invalid comparison in an effectiveness study. The
question whether extra attention given to the TAU group
would reduce the difference between behavioural activation
and TAU is a legitimate one, but goes beyond the scope of
this study.
Fourth, last observation carried forward was not used – this is
a misinterpretation of the paper; intention-to-treat analysis was
used, as it is the gold standard. Analysing only completers leads
to biased conclusions. We used mixed regression analyses that
use all available data and yield valid estimates under certain
assumptions in the light of missing data.3 The suggestion is that
a therapy-completers analysis would yield different conclusions.
However, the effects are quite similar when only treatment-
completers are analysed – Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression:
time6condition, F(1,78.02) = 10.05, P= 0.002; time squared6
condition, F(1,78.40)= 7.94, P=0.006; Beck Depression Inventory:
time6condition, F(1,78.02) = 6.84, P= 0.011; time squared6
condition, F(1,78.35) = 5.37, P=0.023.
Fifth, the influence of referral type was analysed, and tables
with statistics are available online.4 It is difficult to understand
that this was missed (e.g. ‘referral did not change the condition6
time and condition6time squared effects’, p. 207). Moreover, if
anything, the differences between conditions were stronger in
participants who were referred by healthcare professionals.
Finally, all patients were capable of understanding the
information about the offered treatments and making the
necessary decisions. All individuals were seen by a psychiatrist
to check eligibility, including capacity to consent to participate
in the study, as part of the good clinical practice guidelines we
applied.
1 Browne G, Steiner M, Roberts J, Gafni A, Byrne C, Dunn E, et al. Sertraline
and/or interpersonal psychotherapy for patients with dysthymic disorder in
primary care: 6-month comparison with longitudinal 2-year follow-up of
effectiveness and costs. J Affect Disord 2002; 68: 317–30.
2 Sadock BJ, Sadock VA. Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry:
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Effect of 9/11 on suicide:
appropriateness of a time series model
Although the paper by Claassen et al1 investigates an exciting
issue, I have some concerns about the model identification. It
seems that the authors identified the appropriate model of the
time series only by using the Akaike Informations Criterion
(AIC), which has certain limitations. For example, the selected
ARMA (15,0) and ARMA (0,6) models are of high order and long
memory. In general, the AIC suggests such models of high order
only when a trend or seasonality is present in the analysed time
series. Usually, if a time series is stationary, a model of an order
below three is found.2 A more complex method for model
identification that avoids relying only on the AIC was introduced
by Box & Jenkins.2 Their algorithm includes several acquisition
parameters in the process of model identification, which are:4 0,
make the series stationary, consider differencing; 1, choose a
provisional model; 2, estimate the model parameters; and 3, check
the adequacy of the model.
One key aspect is the requirement of stationarity. If the time
series is not stationary, an ARIMA model should be considered
instead of a mere ARMA model. The ARIMA model enables
one to include terms for a trend or seasonality, respectively,
directly in the model. The high order of the chosen model makes
it likely that the time series in the paper indeed possesses a trend
or seasonality. Furthermore, as the ultimate assessment of a
correct model, Box & Jenkins demanded non-significant auto-
correlations of the residuals, which were apparently also not
checked in the paper. As these important aspects were not
respected, the chosen model might not be correct.
Figure 1 below displays a time series with an underlying trend.
When an ARMA model is assumed, the AIC suggests an ARMA
(6,0), which does not fulfil the requirement of non-significant
autocorrelations of the residuals on a significance level of
a= 0.05. Nevertheless, the simple differentiation of the time series
leads to a straightforward ARIMA (1,1,2), which, in contrast to
the previous case, meets this requirement.
The consequence of a non-fitting model would be a falsely
estimated standard error, which would directly lead to insufficient
statistical tests and thus incorrect P-values.2,4–6 When the control
group of suicides in 1998 was regarded, an even larger post-9/11
effect over a period of 180 days was found than in the group of
interest (suicides in 2001). This effect was rejected because of



















Fig. 1 Exemplary time series with an underlying trend.
appropriate under the performed model identification. Therefore,
it would be necessary to re-evaluate the considered time series in
terms of model identification by the Box & Jenkins method and
apply them again to the time series. I expect a notable change
of results.
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Little evidence for the usefulness of violence risk
assessment
Troquete and colleagues report a cluster randomised trial of the
effect of violence risk assessment on future offending.1 They found
that people in the risk assessment group were non-significantly
more likely to re-offend than those in the control group. We
welcome this analysis of the practical value of risk assessment.
There are now literally thousands of published violence risk
assessment studies, most of which claim validity for their risk
assessment method on the basis of statistical discrimination
between violent and non-violent groups using measures such as
the area under the curve (AUC) or other indicators of effect size.2
Recent criticism of the AUC as an outcome measure has emerged
because it does not reflect the accuracy of predictions in the real
world, and even high AUC values are associated with a low
positive predictive value (PPV) for rare events. However, the
PPVof a risk assessment is only a proxy for the usefulness of a risk
assessment. A risk assessment alone is not valuable unless it leads
reasonable interventions that can reduce future harm. Therefore,
the utility of a risk assessment must ultimately be judged by its
ability to contribute to harm reduction. In contrast to the large
number of papers about the statistical aspects of risk assessment,
there may be as few as four published controlled studies of the
ability of risk assessment to reduce harm.2
The British Journal of Psychiatry has published two earlier
studies of the utility of risk assessment. Abderhalden et al reported
a cluster randomised trial of risk assessment among in-patients
that found that intervention wards had a reduction in violence.
However, interpretation of this study is difficult because the
intervention wards had high rates of violence pre-trial and post-
trial rates of violence in the experimental and control wards did
not differ.3 Also in the Journal, van de Sande and colleagues
reported a cluster randomised trial that found that risk assessment
was associated with a reduction in violence but not seclusion
among in-patients.4 In the nursing literature, Kling et al reported
a study in in-patient settings that found that risk assessment was
not helpful in reducing violence.5
Risk assessment has become the dominant paradigm in mental
health practice, policy and legislation in most high-income
countries. It should therefore trouble colleagues who support
‘evidence-based practice’ to know that there is so little evidence
for the effectiveness of risk assessment.
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Authors’ reply: We agree with Wand & Large that there
currently is very limited support for the use of structured risk
assessment instruments as a method for violence prevention. So
far only a small number of studies, four including our own,
examined this issue. It is troubling that most research efforts seem
to focus on the development of new risk assessment instruments
and establishing their psychometric properties, rather than on
testing the effectiveness of existing instruments. Although
identification of predictors and development of instruments are
crucial steps in the maturation of both risk assessment and
forensic psychiatry, the field needs to move beyond these issues.
The most important risk and protective factors associated with
recidivism have by now been established and are agreed on by the
research community. There is no disputing the existence of
correlations between mental illness, substance misuse, client
well-being, quality of life and recidivism. That is why all, or a
considerable selection of these factors, are commonly included
in risk assessment instruments.1–3 It seems it is time to move
forward and start investigating the benefits of risk assessment
instruments and their contribution to more effective treatment
interventions in terms of reduction of criminal and violent
behaviour. As we ourselves have experienced, introducing
randomised trials in clinical practice is difficult, but it can be
done, and is an essential step before implementation can be
advocated.
A definitive answer about the contribution of structured risk
assessment to violence prevention cannot be given at this time.
The first signs are not good. The four available studies find either
no significant reduction of violent outcome, or the interpretation
of their findings is problematic due to differences between study
groups at baseline. Differences in clinical setting of the various
studies further complicate the integration of findings. Our own
data were collected in a community-based forensic mental health
setting. In contrast, the other three studies were completed in
acute psychiatric (admission) wards. These two settings service
different populations, making comparisons less straightforward.
It is too early for a proper systematic review on this subject, but
the overall picture is not yet convincingly in favour of changing
treatment policies by systematically employing structured risk
assessment in clinical care.
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On the other hand, our paper also shows that proper
implementation in clinical care depends on personnel and
organisational factors that need to be addressed in a coherent
and persistent way before meaningful results can be obtained.
The implementation of a randomised controlled trial has its
particular challenges, but so does changing clinical practice in
and of itself.4 As researchers, we may sometimes underestimate
this gap between scientific evidence and the changes necessary
in clinical practice for the implementation of evidence-based
interventions. In order to reach the ultimate goal of prevention
and to determine whether structured risk assessment may
contribute, more studies are needed that assess the results of
properly implemented and already established instruments in
different forms of forensic care.
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